Raghunandan TR Diary: Deficiencies of Indian election system and solutions
A diary from the wall of Raghunandan TR, former Joint Secretary at Govt of India.
Yesterday Renuka and I joined the representatives of all parties who were summoned by the Returning Officer and the General Observer of the ECI to the counting centre, to see the arrangements. We witnessed the sealing of the strong rooms and also got an opportunity to voice our observations and complaints to both of them. We told them of all the irregularities and deficiencies we saw in the process; from the wrongly written or incomplete descriptions of candidates in the notice pasted outside the polling booth, to the intimidation of voters by the ruling MLA, who was allowed to sweep into one polling booth cluster in his SUV motorcade, escorted by a posse of policemen. Later on, we had dinner with our core group of volunteers; people who had given so much time and energy to campaign and stand at the booth help-desks on voting day. Based on our experiences, I have compiled the big six deficiencies of the Indian election system.
I am presenting these regardless of the outcome of the results tomorrow.
Some of these deficiencies can easily be cured by better implementation, others by process change and yet others through legal or constitutional amendments.
Deficiency 1: Inaccurate voter lists:
We discovered many people whose names were not on the voters’s lists. This included long time residents who had voted last time. During door to door campaigning we also saw inconsistency in the addition of new names to the rolls. One lady said that her daughter applied for a voter ID card and submitted an application through the local worker of a particular party, who asked her to vote for it. However, her daughter’s application was kept aside and not acted upon, whereas others who submitted their applications later, got their names in the voters list. In another case a lady complained that she had applied several times, but did not have a card. The AAP has an app in which we can search the voter list database. When we did that, we discovered that she was listed ten times in the voter list, but she did not have a card!
Cure for Deficiency 1:
Better training and monitoring of electoral registration officials. Much more reliable process of verification of applications. Online applications to be popularized rather than through intermediaries. Cursory rejection of online applications to be curbed. Voter awareness campaigns so that they check whether they are voters well before the elections.
Deficiency 2: Ineffective monitoring of campaign expenses:
The ECI has given detailed instructions about campaign expenses. They also prescribe detailed protocols for periodic submission of campaign expenses (4 PM every day, followed by a detailed examination every 3 to 4 days), attribution of expenses, etc. They have also appointed one Expenditure Observer for every two constituencies and one Deputy Expenditure Observer for each constituency. These efforts have limited effect and has only resulted in reduction of banners, advertisements etc. But overall, these efforts only chase pennies. The big expenditure is voter bribing, paid agents for campaigning and for filling crowds. While the last two are difficult to detect and value, because those who conduct campaigns entirely through volunteers will also get unfairly treated, the Expenditure scrutiny process is totally ineffective in controlling voter bribing. That leads to Deficiency 3.
Solution to Deficiency 2:
The solution is related to the solutions for deficiency 3 as well. Read on.
Deficiency 3: Voter Intimidation and bribing:
This is common now, Voter intimidation is through goondas who deliver obvious threats that if the candidate wins and the area concerned is seen not to vote for the winning candidate, then there will be reprisals. Fear is not only spread against vulnerable groups of people like those who live in slums or the poor. Even the rich are delivered threats, such as the discontinuance of essential services such as water or waste disposal. The rich and the middle class succumb much faster to threats than others.
Bribing is rampant and has reached runaway proportions. Bribes are delivered in many forms well in advance of the poll, till the very last hour of the poll. Not only the poor, but also the lower middle class and the middle class now expect bribes to vote, and they negotiate with all parties, sometimes. Bribery is also linked to intimidation; for example, where voter ID cards are impounded by party goons and handed over only on the day of voting, to create psychological pressure, or not handed over at all, to deny the voter the right to vote (which is actually wrong, because a voter can vote even if she does not have the voter card). Intimidation is also through the spreading of rumors such as that the VVPAT machine will take photographs of the voter.
Solution to deficiency 3:
Bribing and intimidation has reached dangerous proportions due to the ineffectiveness of the ECI in controlling it. The ECI has become completely soft, and is a far cry from the institution it used to be when Sheshan, Krishnamurthy and Lyngdoh were Commissioners. There is no cure for bribing except for swift and harsh action. Elections have to be stopped and candidates who bribe disqualified. Parties who engage in such activities should be punished with large fines with steep increases for repeat offences. If this is done in a few cases, all parties will back off. ECI will receive widespread support from people overall, including those who are bribed, if they take impartial, tough action.
Deficiency 4: Dilution of secrecy of the ballot:
The current process of counting is that the EVMs are counted booth wise. This enables political parties to keep track of the proportion of votes, party wise, cast in each booth. This is very dangerous information and it partly compromises the secrecy of the ballot. Access to this information gives scope to candidates to threaten voters who they bribe. They can tell them that in case the booth records less votes in their favor than the number of voters bribed, and the candidate concerned still wins, he can harm the voters of the booth collectively, by denying them government benefits.
Solution for deficiency 4:
There must be a process for randomization of EVM machines during the counting process so as to permanently lose the connection of each EVM to the polling booth at which it was used. There are many techniques that could be used to do this. In the old days this could not happen because we mixed the ballot papers together in big drums before bundling them in bundles of 50 votes each and counting them. This destroyed the link between votes cast and the booths.
This is also related to Deficiency 5
Deficiency 5: Machine unreliability:
In spite of several safeguards including repeated testing both by election authorities and candidates themselves, the EVM-ballot unit-VVPAT combo of machines is unreliable. In Shanthinagar constituency itself there were at least 20 mechanical breakdowns and some of them also included instances where the VVPAT machines were printing ballots different from the button pressed. These are serious lacunae and even one instance can vitiate any trust in the electronic system.
Solution for Deficiency 5:
I think that EVM and electronic based voting systems carry unfathomable risks. It is expensive, not durable and its benefits are only that results are made available a few hours earlier than when ballot papers were used. All the arguments used to justify the convenience of EVMs are hollow ones. The manufacture of these machines is expensive. The repeated testing is expensive. The ‘paper saving environmentally friendly’ argument is invalid after the introduction of the VVPAT and the use of expensive thermal paper in it. I am not even examining the theories of remote manipulation, because I believe the use of VVPAT machines does minimize that threat, because vigilant voters can see the VVPAT slip and cross verify with their electronic vote. In my view we must go back to the old system of paper ballots cast into boxes. This is (a) cheap, (b) easy to understand (c) very durable – the ballot boxes and its contents can be preserved for years, unlike thermal paper impressions in the VVPAT that can fade away in six months (d) all things considered, it is not as environmentally unfriendly as one thinks. The paper used is probably as much as the newsprint for a single day and (e) it easily preserves the secrecy of the ballot completely, because ballot papers of all boxes are mixed together and then counted. This destroys the link of the box with the polling booth and therefore reduces the incentive for bribing, as it erases the trail of cause and effect of bribing. The only disadvantage of paper ballots are that the risks of booth capturing are higher (which can be countered by increased police presence) and counting takes more time (which I think is a price we can afford to pay, in return for reliability).
Deficiency 6: First Past the Post System distorts the mandate:
The mandates of the winner takes it all system we have in India distorts the democratic will of the people. Constituency sizes vary dramatically in the number of votes per constituency. Thus the value of the votes of individual citizens in India differs from constituency to constituency. Plus, small swings of the voting can affect the final outcome significantly. This incentive bribing, intimidation of voters and the distorting of the voters list.
Solution to Deficiency 6:
This is the big ticket reform and will require constitional amendment. What can replace this system? I am not sure. But in the larger context of the need to strengthen democracy in the country, we must begin and vigorously pursue the debate.
I believe that if these deficiencies are not addressed, people will lose faith in democracy. If that goes beyond a tipping point – I cannot define what that tipping point will be and when it will be reached – we might lose our country as well, in one bloody orgy of violence and anarchy. If we do not fix these, we might as well kiss democracy and India goodbye.
Sorry, for being blunt, but there is no point glossing over my fears.
T. R. Raghunandan, (Retired IAS officer)
Election Agent for Renuka Viswanathan (Retired IAS officer),
Candidate from the Aam Aadmi Party,
163 Shantinagar Constituency
Karnataka
Original post can be read here on Facebook. Read more from Raghunandan TR Diary.
Yesterday Renuka and I joined the representatives of all parties who were summoned by the Returning Officer and the General Observer of the ECI to the counting centre, to see the arrangements. We witnessed the sealing of the strong rooms and also got an opportunity to voice our observations and complaints to both of them. We told them of all the irregularities and deficiencies we saw in the process; from the wrongly written or incomplete descriptions of candidates in the notice pasted outside the polling booth, to the intimidation of voters by the ruling MLA, who was allowed to sweep into one polling booth cluster in his SUV motorcade, escorted by a posse of policemen. Later on, we had dinner with our core group of volunteers; people who had given so much time and energy to campaign and stand at the booth help-desks on voting day. Based on our experiences, I have compiled the big six deficiencies of the Indian election system.
I am presenting these regardless of the outcome of the results tomorrow.
Some of these deficiencies can easily be cured by better implementation, others by process change and yet others through legal or constitutional amendments.
Deficiency 1: Inaccurate voter lists:
We discovered many people whose names were not on the voters’s lists. This included long time residents who had voted last time. During door to door campaigning we also saw inconsistency in the addition of new names to the rolls. One lady said that her daughter applied for a voter ID card and submitted an application through the local worker of a particular party, who asked her to vote for it. However, her daughter’s application was kept aside and not acted upon, whereas others who submitted their applications later, got their names in the voters list. In another case a lady complained that she had applied several times, but did not have a card. The AAP has an app in which we can search the voter list database. When we did that, we discovered that she was listed ten times in the voter list, but she did not have a card!
Cure for Deficiency 1:
Better training and monitoring of electoral registration officials. Much more reliable process of verification of applications. Online applications to be popularized rather than through intermediaries. Cursory rejection of online applications to be curbed. Voter awareness campaigns so that they check whether they are voters well before the elections.
Deficiency 2: Ineffective monitoring of campaign expenses:
The ECI has given detailed instructions about campaign expenses. They also prescribe detailed protocols for periodic submission of campaign expenses (4 PM every day, followed by a detailed examination every 3 to 4 days), attribution of expenses, etc. They have also appointed one Expenditure Observer for every two constituencies and one Deputy Expenditure Observer for each constituency. These efforts have limited effect and has only resulted in reduction of banners, advertisements etc. But overall, these efforts only chase pennies. The big expenditure is voter bribing, paid agents for campaigning and for filling crowds. While the last two are difficult to detect and value, because those who conduct campaigns entirely through volunteers will also get unfairly treated, the Expenditure scrutiny process is totally ineffective in controlling voter bribing. That leads to Deficiency 3.
Solution to Deficiency 2:
The solution is related to the solutions for deficiency 3 as well. Read on.
Deficiency 3: Voter Intimidation and bribing:
This is common now, Voter intimidation is through goondas who deliver obvious threats that if the candidate wins and the area concerned is seen not to vote for the winning candidate, then there will be reprisals. Fear is not only spread against vulnerable groups of people like those who live in slums or the poor. Even the rich are delivered threats, such as the discontinuance of essential services such as water or waste disposal. The rich and the middle class succumb much faster to threats than others.
Bribing is rampant and has reached runaway proportions. Bribes are delivered in many forms well in advance of the poll, till the very last hour of the poll. Not only the poor, but also the lower middle class and the middle class now expect bribes to vote, and they negotiate with all parties, sometimes. Bribery is also linked to intimidation; for example, where voter ID cards are impounded by party goons and handed over only on the day of voting, to create psychological pressure, or not handed over at all, to deny the voter the right to vote (which is actually wrong, because a voter can vote even if she does not have the voter card). Intimidation is also through the spreading of rumors such as that the VVPAT machine will take photographs of the voter.
Solution to deficiency 3:
Bribing and intimidation has reached dangerous proportions due to the ineffectiveness of the ECI in controlling it. The ECI has become completely soft, and is a far cry from the institution it used to be when Sheshan, Krishnamurthy and Lyngdoh were Commissioners. There is no cure for bribing except for swift and harsh action. Elections have to be stopped and candidates who bribe disqualified. Parties who engage in such activities should be punished with large fines with steep increases for repeat offences. If this is done in a few cases, all parties will back off. ECI will receive widespread support from people overall, including those who are bribed, if they take impartial, tough action.
Deficiency 4: Dilution of secrecy of the ballot:
The current process of counting is that the EVMs are counted booth wise. This enables political parties to keep track of the proportion of votes, party wise, cast in each booth. This is very dangerous information and it partly compromises the secrecy of the ballot. Access to this information gives scope to candidates to threaten voters who they bribe. They can tell them that in case the booth records less votes in their favor than the number of voters bribed, and the candidate concerned still wins, he can harm the voters of the booth collectively, by denying them government benefits.
Solution for deficiency 4:
There must be a process for randomization of EVM machines during the counting process so as to permanently lose the connection of each EVM to the polling booth at which it was used. There are many techniques that could be used to do this. In the old days this could not happen because we mixed the ballot papers together in big drums before bundling them in bundles of 50 votes each and counting them. This destroyed the link between votes cast and the booths.
This is also related to Deficiency 5
Deficiency 5: Machine unreliability:
In spite of several safeguards including repeated testing both by election authorities and candidates themselves, the EVM-ballot unit-VVPAT combo of machines is unreliable. In Shanthinagar constituency itself there were at least 20 mechanical breakdowns and some of them also included instances where the VVPAT machines were printing ballots different from the button pressed. These are serious lacunae and even one instance can vitiate any trust in the electronic system.
Solution for Deficiency 5:
I think that EVM and electronic based voting systems carry unfathomable risks. It is expensive, not durable and its benefits are only that results are made available a few hours earlier than when ballot papers were used. All the arguments used to justify the convenience of EVMs are hollow ones. The manufacture of these machines is expensive. The repeated testing is expensive. The ‘paper saving environmentally friendly’ argument is invalid after the introduction of the VVPAT and the use of expensive thermal paper in it. I am not even examining the theories of remote manipulation, because I believe the use of VVPAT machines does minimize that threat, because vigilant voters can see the VVPAT slip and cross verify with their electronic vote. In my view we must go back to the old system of paper ballots cast into boxes. This is (a) cheap, (b) easy to understand (c) very durable – the ballot boxes and its contents can be preserved for years, unlike thermal paper impressions in the VVPAT that can fade away in six months (d) all things considered, it is not as environmentally unfriendly as one thinks. The paper used is probably as much as the newsprint for a single day and (e) it easily preserves the secrecy of the ballot completely, because ballot papers of all boxes are mixed together and then counted. This destroys the link of the box with the polling booth and therefore reduces the incentive for bribing, as it erases the trail of cause and effect of bribing. The only disadvantage of paper ballots are that the risks of booth capturing are higher (which can be countered by increased police presence) and counting takes more time (which I think is a price we can afford to pay, in return for reliability).
Deficiency 6: First Past the Post System distorts the mandate:
The mandates of the winner takes it all system we have in India distorts the democratic will of the people. Constituency sizes vary dramatically in the number of votes per constituency. Thus the value of the votes of individual citizens in India differs from constituency to constituency. Plus, small swings of the voting can affect the final outcome significantly. This incentive bribing, intimidation of voters and the distorting of the voters list.
Solution to Deficiency 6:
This is the big ticket reform and will require constitional amendment. What can replace this system? I am not sure. But in the larger context of the need to strengthen democracy in the country, we must begin and vigorously pursue the debate.
I believe that if these deficiencies are not addressed, people will lose faith in democracy. If that goes beyond a tipping point – I cannot define what that tipping point will be and when it will be reached – we might lose our country as well, in one bloody orgy of violence and anarchy. If we do not fix these, we might as well kiss democracy and India goodbye.
Sorry, for being blunt, but there is no point glossing over my fears.
T. R. Raghunandan, (Retired IAS officer)
Election Agent for Renuka Viswanathan (Retired IAS officer),
Candidate from the Aam Aadmi Party,
163 Shantinagar Constituency
Karnataka
Original post can be read here on Facebook. Read more from Raghunandan TR Diary.
Nice Information.
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